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It is becoming increasingly common for web application and data storage services to be handled by cloud computing; therefore, more and more people are 
putting their private information on the internet, motivating research into cloud computing, database security and authority encryption. In the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) assessment, SQL injection is one of the most dangerous attack vectors in internet security. With this in mind, we 
have implemented a system named the website security mining system, which leverages a web crawling algorithm to analyze web URL and e-mail address 
leaks through black-box testing of 20 well-known universities’ websites. Based on our data, academic website maintainers can be clearly informed about 
what kind of danger they are exposed to, which URLs are highly in danger, and the need to patch the website to protect against vulnerabilities and prevent 
academic resources from attacks. We hope that in the future, academic networks will gain more attention in the information security community, just like 
commercial and government networks today. 
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Uvođenje i analiza sustava za probijanje sigurnosti web mjesta s primjenom na sveučilišne akademske mreže 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Sve je uobičajenije za web aplikacije i poslužitelje za pohranu podataka rukovanje putem programskog rješenja u oblaku; stoga je sve veći broj ljudi koji 
svoje privatne podatke stavljaju na internet, motivirajući istraživanje mogućnosti programskog rješenja u oblaku, sigurnosti baza podataka i kodiranih 
nadležnosti. U procjeni Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)-a, ubacivanje SQL-a jedan je od najopasnijih napadnih vektora na sigurnost 
interneta. Imajući to u vidu, uveli smo sustav nazvan sustav za probijanje sigurnosti web mjesta, koji pokreće algoritam za pretraživanje weba kako bi 
analizirao propuste na zaštiti URL-a i adresa e-pošte ispitivanjem crnih kutija web mjesta 20 poznatih sveučilišta. Na temelju naših podataka, održavatelji 
akademskih web mjesta mogu saznati kakvoj su opasnosti izloženi, kojim URL-ovima prijeti veća opasnost i što učiniti kako bi uredili web stranicu za 
zaštitu od ranjivosti i sprijećili napade na akademske resurse. Nadamo se da će se u budućnosti veća pažnja posvetiti sigurnosti informacija na 
akademskim mrežama, kako se to danas čini s komercijalnim i vladinim mrežama. 
Ključne riječi: akademske mreže; sigurnost baza podataka; stroj za pretraživanje; testiranje crne kutije; ubacivanje SQL 
1     Research motivation 
Due to the broad availability of web applications, 
securing a web application (particularly one backed by a 
database) is much more challenging than securing a 
traditional application [1]. Some security researchers have 
attempted to convey the concepts of information security 
to web application programmers [2]. However, these 
concepts are often not successfully applied. After all, 
human thoughts are much more uncontrollable [3, 4] than 
computer software; therefore, humans still need to use 
external programs to help analyze security issues in 
source code, web application services, and even the entire 
operating environment. For example, some researchers 
have used bounded model checking to analyze web 
application security [5] but this approach still fails to 
account fully for the dynamic environment that real web 
applications must deal with. SQL injection attacks have 
been known for decades, but due to improper handling of 
user input, these attack modalities are still leveraged 
towards nefarious purposes such as executing arbitrary 
database queries to, for example, delete data or steal user 
account information [6].       
Academic networks are typically smaller and simpler 
than commercial and government networks, where the 
issue of information security is given more attention. 
However, academic networks still face serious risks. 
Commercial networks contain much private data and 
government networks contain government documents, 
which motivates strong security measures as compared to 
academic networks where malware attacks are more 
common [7, 8]. However, academic networks do contain 
valuable information, such as proprietary academic 
material and private personal data.  
This research applies web crawling and keyword 
searching, the core elements of a search engine, with 
automated vulnerability detection to implement the 
Website Security Mining System (WSMS), which we 
applied to websites of the top 20 universities (ranked by 
Quacquarelli Symonds) [9]. Comparing the difference 
among these well-known universities’ security protection 
schemes reveals some interesting phenomena which 
deserve more attention in the web security community. 
2      Introduction of the core system and techniques 
The WSMS is designed to combine search engine 
technology with vulnerability testing to automatically 
spider and assess the security of a target website. Below, 
the key technologies involved are discussed: search 
engines, web vulnerability mining, and SQL injection 
attacks. 
2.1 Search engines 
Although there are differences in the designs of every 
search engine, the key components can be broken into 
four categories: Web Crawler, Indexer, Searcher and User 
Interface. The detailed functions are as follows: 
• Web Crawler: A web crawler moves throughout the
internet, collecting web pages and metadata for use in
building the other components of a search engine
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listed below. A web crawler typically starts at one 
URL and then follows links on that web site to find 
other URLs. Because content can rapidly change, a 
web crawler needs to repeatedly revisit sites that it 
has already visited previously.  
• Indexer: An indexer analyzes web pages that have 
been downloaded by the web crawler, then sifts out 
useless information and keeps useful information to 
make a query index, which allows for fast infor-
mation retrieval. 
• Searcher: A searcher uses the query index database 
created by the indexer to determine which results to 
display to the user. Searchers can be based on a varie-
ty of metrics such as quality, relevance, and populari-
ty. 
• User Interface: A search engine is of little use if users 
cannot access it. Therefore, a user interface is neces-
sary to allow the user to query the search engine and 
to display results in a human-friendly manner. A 
search engine’s basic framework is depicted as Fig. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Framework for a search engine
 
 
Figure 2 Top ten web application threats 
 
2.2 Web vulnerability mining 
 
According to OWASP’s [53, 54] statistics in 2010, 
SQL injection attacks are one of the most dangerous 
attack vectors among web applications’ top ten security 
threats, accounting for 18 % of all attacks. These statistics 
are shown in Fig. 2 [53]. 
A weakness in a system’s security is also called a 
vulnerability, which has been defined in RFC2828 [16] as 
following: "A flaw or weakness in a system’s design 
implementation or operation and management that could 
be exploited to violate the system’s security policy". 
There are two ways to analyze vulnerabilities: 
• Static Analysis: Analyzes a web page’s source code 
to attempt to find vulnerabilities.  If one can control 
all of a program’s behaviors, then one can find all the 
possible interactions between user input and internal 
program logic, which can reveal functional 
parameters that may have problematic security 
properties. By comparing known classes of 
vulnerabilities against source code, static analysis can 
identify potential flaws for developers to repair [17]. 
• Dynamic Analysis: Identifies security problems by 
directly interacting with a functioning web site. In 
other words, dynamic analysis relies on simulating 
user interactions with web pages, including 
interactions designed with potentially malicious 
intent. Because dynamic analysis uses a real website 
to find vulnerabilities in real time, found 
vulnerabilities are much more likely to be real than 
with static analysis, which has problems with 
detecting false positives [18, 19]. 
 
Based on the above two general analysis technique 
categories, many more specific analysis methods have 
been created, some of which even combine static and 
dynamic analysis [20]. For instance, black box testing, 
fuzz testing and penetration testing are all growing 
increasingly common. 
Black box testing determines whether a web 
application has vulnerability by inputting testing data to 
the application and analyzing its response [21], as 
opposed to white box testing which focuses on source 
code parsing and analysis. White box testing tends to have 
lower efficiency because it does not factor in the dynamic 
interplay between the web server, application server, and 
database server [22]. Therefore, it is more common to use 
black box testing to more holistically analyze web 
application’s vulnerability [23]. Fuzzing [24] is automatic 
software testing technique that is based on vulnerability 
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injection which uses lots of invalid or even random data 
as input to analyze whether vulnerabilities can be detected 
in these abnormal scenarios. Fuzzing does not have the 
False Positive problem caused by the static analysis, and 
it also does not need lots of people to do the reverse 
engineering because it can be highly automated. 
Therefore, fuzzing is a technique that has high efficiency 
and low cost [14, 15]. Fuzzing is widely used. Many 
companies and organizations use it to improve the quality 
of software; vulnerability analyzers use it to discover and 
report vulnerabilities; and hackers use it to discover and 
exploit vulnerabilities. Penetration testing is a method to 
estimate the security of computer system or internet 
security by actively simulating attacks [24, 25]. This 
method analyzes all possible injection weaknesses in the 
system, so the testing result is very valuable and 
convincing. The end product is not simply potential 
vulnerabilities, but verified vulnerabilities and exploits. 
Honest testing result can form a bridge between developer 
and information security communities [26, 27]. The 
WSMS was created by combining several of these 
concepts discussed above. 
 
2.3  SQL injection attacks 
 
SQL injection attacks [28] take advantage of the 
process of web applications accessing databases with 
queries based on improperly-validated user input. The 
WSMS finds SQL injection attacks which can bypass 
firewall and identity authorization to control the database 
[29]. SQL injection can penetrate any type of database 
that relies on SQL, regardless of whether the underlying 
web application is written in ASP, PHP or JSP as long as 
the program has a severe yet common logic error. 
Although there are well-known techniques to combat 
SQL injection attacks [30, 31], they are still quite 
common and therefore there has been much interest in 
developing methods to inspect web applications and 
detect these vulnerabilities [29, 32, 33]. 
 
3      System implementation 
 
In order to inspect whether information stored on the 
web presents a security risk, this research combines a web 
crawler, like those used in search engines, with the 
concept of application vulnerability inspection, 
specifically black box and penetration testing. The end 
product is the WSMS, a tool to evaluate a website’s 
security [36, 37]. This system can be separated into two 
main modules which are the Static Mining Module and 
the Dynamic Scanning Module. The Static Mining 
Module inspects a specific website’s robots.txt, e-mails, 
potential SQL injection URLs, files, and broken links. 
The Dynamic Scanning Module uses the system’s 
vulnerability-inspecting function by typing keywords into 
a search engine’s query box to inspect many websites.  
Both of the Static Mining and Dynamic Scanning 
modules can lever the system’s vulnerability inspecting 
function, which has two parts: known website 
vulnerability inspection and SQL injection inspection. 
The former compiles a database of open source website 
vulnerabilities into an XML file which is used to inspect 
the website to see whether it has the same vulnerability. 
Fig. 3 is the format of an XML file. The bug file 
parameter is a base64 hash and other parameters are 
converted from the open source website vulnerabilities 
database. Our system updates its vulnerability database by 
adopting new vulnerabilities that have been announced on 
the Exploit Database regularly [34]. By updating the 
vulnerability database, we can ensure that the 
vulnerability samples are always updated, similar to how 
antivirus software regularly updates its virus database.  
 
 
Figure 3 XML Format 
 
The WSMS can find vulnerabilities in a variety of 
database engines, specifically MS-SQL, MySQL, Access, 
Oracle, Postgresql, and Sqlite. The steps to identify SQL 
injection vulnerabilities are as follows. First, an injectable 
point must be identified by inspecting the website for 
places where user input may be used in SQL queries. If 
such an injectable point is found, then further tests are 
conducted to identify the specific type of database engine. 
To do this, we take advantage of how different databases 
use different function names for certain tasks. For 
example, MS-SQL and MySQL use len( ) to calculate 
length, while Oracle uses length() to do this. In other 
words, when you use len(‘s’)=1 to test and receive a 
normal response, the target website uses MS-SQL or 
MySQL. On the other hand, if this does not work, then the 
database might be Oracle or other database type. There 
are several other functions that can help us determine 
what the database is. After getting the database’s type, we 
can obtain table and column names and finally get the 
database’s data.  
The WSMS can run on any operating systems which 
are supported by Java. We describe the two basic modules 
in more detail below. 
 
3.1 Static mining module 
 
The Static Mining Module runs depth mining on a 
specific website. There is an option to determine whether 
you want to follow the website’s robot.txt rules. Robot.txt 
[35] is an ASCII-encoded file stored in the website’s root 
directory that lists files that can and cannot be accessed by 
search engine crawlers. There is no official standards 
body or RFC for the robots.txt format. It was created by 
consensus and ultimately serves only as a 
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recommendation for crawlers, so it cannot protect the 
website’s private data completely. Other functions of the 
Static Mining module are identifying e-mail information, 
potentially injectable URLs, downloadable files, and 
broken links, which may contain private information. 
 
 
Figure 4 Static mining module 
 
 
Figure 5 Database content found by injectable URLs 
 
 
Figure 6 Operating system of the host 
 
The Static Mining Module starts with a specific web 
site and then collects all the related pages from it using a 
breath-first search algorithm. The system assumes that 
web pages have close relations to the original web page if 
the link distance is within a certain range [38, 39], so it 
will fetch all links inside the original page then iterate 
through all of those URLs to fetch all links within them. 
This type of method can be easily parallelized to improve 
fetching speed. After files are downloaded by the web 
crawler, an HTML parser process extracts pages’ URLs 
and then adds it into the URL queue. Also, the system 
will call vulnerability inspecting process to inspect URLs, 
checking whether it has potential vulnerabilities or not. 
Fig. 4 shows the process of mining a college’s 
website [40] by our system. Several injectable URLs were 
found and by exploiting these vulnerabilities we were able 
to retrieve the database information shown in Fig. 5. 
Additionally, we determined that the operating 
system (OS) of the host was "Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional", as shown in Fig. 6, which could open up 
the possibility for further OS-based exploits. 
 
3.2 Dynamic scanning module 
 
The most popular search engines today are Google, 
Yahoo, Baidu, Microsoft Bing, NHN, eBay, Ask.com, 
Yandex and Alibaba. With the help of search engines, we 
can find billions of web pages and their URLs. Our 
system inspects these websites to determine whether they 
have vulnerabilities by analyzing the results retrieved 
from search engines. Our system supports the kinds of 
query syntaxes used in modern search engines. After you 
input the keywords, the system can find all related web 
pages and inspect whether they are at risk for 
vulnerabilities or not.  
 
 
Figure 7 Working on different search engines 
 
 
Figure 8 Results of dynamic scanning 
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Fig. 7 shows the different query syntaxes used in 
different search engines. For Google, it is "inurl:.asp? 
site:edu nobel prize"; Yahoo is "inurl:.php? site:edu 
education"; Baidu is "inurl:.jsp? site:edu research"; Bing 
is "inurl:.aspx? site:edu academic". 
This research used the same command, inurl:.asp? 
|.jsp?|. php?|.aspx?site:com new, to search the ten most 
popular search engines. 800 web pages were retrieved 
from each search engine. We found 550 SQL injectable 
URLs and 21 known website vulnerabilities out of this 
total of 8000 web pages, which are shown in Fig. 8 below. 
This highlights the fact that SQL injection problems are 
still very severe on the internet. 
 
4      Real experimental analysis 
 
This research tested websites of the top 20 
universities based on the Quacquarelli Symonds 2012 
ranking by applying the Static Mining Module to gather 
e-mail addresses and find injectable URLs. This analysis 
was done on a single computer running Windows XP on 
an Intel Core I3-540 processor and 1 GB of RAM. Each 
university’s website was allotted a maximum of 72 hours 
for analysis, although some analyses terminated before 
the time limit. 
Tab. 1 shows the number of e-mail addresses and 
injectable URLs found after 72 hours’ mining the 
websites of 20 universities. Six universities exposed over 
ten thousands e-mail addresses and nine universities had 
URLs that could be injected. In total, there were 152523 
e-mail addresses and 34 injectable URLs detected in this 
experiment. Fig. 9 below shows an example of the direct 
output of the system in terms of e-mail addresses, 
injectable URLs, and broken links. 
 

























Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) web.mit.edu 12122 0 
University of Cambridge www.cam.ac.uk 6075 1 
Harvard University www.harvard.edu 8081 0 
University College Lon-
don (UCL) www.ucl.ac.uk 4589 4 
University of Oxford www.ox.ac.uk 15324 2 
Imperial College London www3.imperial.ac.uk 978 0 
Yale University www.yale.edu 9056 7 
University of Chicago www.uchicago.edu 2888 0 
Princeton University www.princeton.edu 7434 1 
California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech) www.caltech.edu 6822 2 
Columbia University www.columbia.edu 16732 4 
University of Pennsylva-
nia www.upenn.edu 7967 1 
ETH Zurich (Swiss Fed-
eral Institute of Technol-
ogy) 
www.ethz.ch 778 2 
Cornell University www.cornell.edu 545 5 
Stanford University www.stanford.edu 8733 9 
Johns Hopkins University www.jhu.edu 10067 4 
University of Michigan www.umich.edu 310 1 
McGill University www.mcgill.ca 5056 10 
University of Toronto www.utoronto.ca 11746 14 
Duke University www.duke.edu 17427 6 
 
 
Figure 9 Program output, showing-mail address, injectable URLs, and 
broken links 
 
The data from Tab. 1 is further summarized in Fig. 10 
and 11 below, showing the distributions of e-mail and 
injectable URL counts by university. From these two 
figures, we observe that the universities which have over 
a thousand leaked e-mail addresses account for 80 % of 
the total in the experimental samples. This experiment 
shows most universities do not take any extra steps to 
process the "@" symbol, such as changing @ to "at" or 
replacing it with a @ picture. As for the injectable URL’s 
inspection, we found that nine universities have howintion 
vulnerabilities which might let hackers gain access to 
underlying databases for a variety of malicious purposes.  
 
 
Figure 10 Bar chart of the amount of e-mail addresses found  
for each university 
 
 
Figure 11 Line chart of the number of injectable URLs found  
for each university 
 
 
Figure 12 Detailed analysis of injected URLs 
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Fig. 12 below shows details of the 20 universities’ 
websites, including database type, database name, and the 
specific formats used for injection attacks. For further 
research to explore the databases, we were able to identify 
the content of databases, for instance as is shown in Fig. 
13. Additionally, we found some databases that stored 
user account passwords in clear text rather than hashing 
them, shown in Fig. 14. 
 
 
Figure 13 Content in a database revealed by an injection attack 
 
 
Figure 14 Accounts and passwords stored in the database 
 
5 Response strategies 
 
SQL injection has been a dangerous yet common 
attack vector for many years. However, during our 
penetration testing, we identified many cases of privacy 
leakage, most commonly through the exploitation of SQL 
injection vulnerabilities that should be fixed. Consider 
this example in PHP: 
$sql=“SELECT id,name,mail,cv,blog,twitter FROM 
register WHERE id= 
“.mysql_real_escape_string($_GET[‘id’]); 
 






This attack may bypass the intended protection from 
"mysql_real_escape_string" and instead allow for injected 
code, since "mysql_real_escape_string" only creates 
characters overflow of ", \r, \n, NULL, and Control-Z. In 
the URL above, these characters are totally avoided in the 
payload. Though the programmer may add in more 
characters to protect against such as "space", 
"parentheses", "SELECT" or "INSERT" to expand the 
scope of prevention, it is not sufficiently effective, but a 




SELECT passwd from users where us-
er=0x61646D696E 
/* Hexadecimal encoding  0x61646D696E =admin*/ 
 
Despite the number of vulnerabilities we found, the 
majority of websites were secure to our attempts thanks to 
sound security practices. Practical approaches towards 
protecting against SQL injection attacks are summarized 
as follows: 
 
A. Pre-prepared Statements  
Replacing the parameters in SQL statements with 
prepared statements. Consider this prepared statement 
written in Java: 
String Stuname = re-
quest.getParameter(“studentName”); 
//This should REALLY be validated too 
//perform input validation to detect attacks 
String query = “SELECT student_score FROM us-
er_data WHERE user_name = ? ”; 
PreparedSttatement pstmt = connec-
tion.prepareStatement( query ); 
pstmt.setString( 1, stuname ); 
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( ); 
 
From the programmer’s perspective, the semantics of 
the SQL query remain the same using prepared 
statements. However, attackers will fail to change the 
structure of SQL when we use "?" as the parameter in 
SQL statement. As is shown below in PHP, even if 
attackers input string like tom’ or ‘1’ = ’1, database will 
take it as username to query. 
$query = “INSERT INTO myData (Name, Height, 
Weight) VALUES (?,?,?)”; 
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare($query); 
$stmt = $bind_param(“sdd”, $val1, $val2, $val3); 
$val1 = ‘Fred’; 
$val2 = ‘177.7’; 
$val3 = ’77.7’; 
/* Execute the statement */ 
$stmt->execute(); 
 
Different methods are adopted for prepared statements 
in each language: 
• Java EE – use PreparedStatement() with bind varia-
bles 
• NET – use parameterized queries like SqlCommand() 
or OleDbCommand() with bind variables 
• PHP – use PDO with strongly typed parameterized 
queries (using bindParam()) 
• Hibernate – use createQuery() with bind variables 
(called named parameters in Hibernate) 
• SQLite – use sqlite3_prepare() to create a statement 
object 
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B. Using Stored Procedures 
The difference between stored procedure and prepared 
statement is that stored procedure is defined and stored at 
the database level, rather than the application level. Also, 
a stored procedure itself might have an injection problem 
if it is built from user input as a dynamic SQL query. In 
that case, one should first apply strict input filtering to 
deal with input data from users. In the code below, 
sp_getStudentScore is a stored procedure: 
String stuname = 
request.getParameter(“studentName”); 
//This should REALLY be validated too 
try { 
   CallableStatement cs = 
connection.prepareCall(“{call 
sp_getStudentScore(?)}”); 
   Cs.setString(1, stuname); 
ResultSet results = cs.executeQuery(); 
//… result set handling 
} catch (SQLException se) { 
//… logging and error handling} 
 
Sometimes it is impractical to use prepared statements 
or stored procedures, for instance due to working with 
legacy code. In those scenarios, a strong focus must be 
placed on filtering input data. 
 
C. Data Type Inspection 
Checking the data type of input data can prevent SQL 
injection efficiently. The following PHP code restricts the 
input data type to be an integer, which makes it un-
injectable: 
settype($offset, ‘integer’); 
$query = sprint(“SELECT id, name FROM products 
ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET %d ;”,$offset); 
 
Checking the data format and data type is very 
beneficial. For example, when users input e-mail 
addresses, time, and date, these formats can all be 
checked to ensure that they are strictly adhered to. But 
checking data type is not invulnerable, as if the request 
needs the user to send arbitrary strings, for example, one 
must take care to appropriately handle these strings. 
 
D. Using Safety Functions 
Nearly every web programming language has built in 
functions to properly escape variables for use in SQL que-
ries. When that is not available, each database vendor has 
its own strategy to deal with it. Taking MySQL for exam-
ple, it can use the following rules to encode characters: 
NUL (0x00)  \0 
BS  (0x08)  \b 
TAB (0x09)  \t 
LF  (0x0a)  \n 
CR  (0x0d)  \r 
SUB (0x1a)  \z 
“  (0x22)  \” 
%   (0x25)  \% 
‘  (0x27)  \’ 
\   (0x5c)  \\ 
_   (0x5f)  \_ 
 
All other non-alphanumeric characters with ASCII 
values less than  
256--> \c  
 
where ‘c’ is the original non-alphanumeric character. 
Also, we can use the functions of OWASP ESAPI which 
are written by security experts, for instance: 
ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL( new OracleCodec(), 
queryparam); 
Codec ORACLE_CODEC = new OracleCodec(); 
String query = “SELECT user_id FROM user_data WHERE 
user_name = ‘ ” + ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL( 
ORACLE_CODEC, req.getParameter(“userID”)) 
+ “ ‘ and user_password = ‘ “  
+ ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL( ORACLE_CODEC, 
req.getParameter(“pwd”) ) 
+ “ ‘ “; 
 
Another fundamental principle of security is that the 
web application should have the minimal amount of 
power it needs to accomplish its task, and no more; this is 
known as the principle of least privilege. If there are 
different applications using the same database, then each 
application should use a separate account that cannot 
access the data from other applications. The database 
account used by web application should not have the 
authority to create functions or operate on files. If the 
principles discussed above are followed, then SQL 
injection attacks will become increasingly rare. 
 
6     Conclusions and future work 
 
Static and dynamic analysis cannot produce a full 
picture of web site security; therefore, we can use code 
review to make up for the deficiencies of static analysis 
and penetration testing to make up for the deficiencies of 
dynamic analysis. Penetration testing is invaluable in 
improving the security of us applications. Deep 
penetration testing, which executes human-like actions, 
can make up the deficiencies of dynamic analysis. Similar 
to how code review needs some specialized software to 
do code inspection, penetration testing also requires some 
domain-specific tools which can vastly improve 
efficiency. Even though automated analysis tools are 
growing more and more sophisticated, the human element 
inherent in code review and penetration testing is still of 
critical importance.  
These days, there are many automated programs to 
aim at data collection from the internet [55]. If harvested 
e-mail addresses are sent malware, it could lead to many 
security problems [41 ÷ 43]. From the inspection we ran 
on university web sites, we found lots of academic 
websites do not cover the characteristic of "@" to mask 
email addresses and they also do not optimize robot.txt 
settings [35, 44, 45], which let us easily find thousands of 
mail addresses. However, there are also many academic 
websites with more strict security procedures that do not 
expose e-mail addresses and do not have injection 
vulnerabilities [46, 47]. Furthermore, our research showed 
that many databases on academic servers contained 
valuable data (including passwords) in plaintext, which 
could obviously be of great value to malicious hackers 
who could exploit similar vulnerabilities to access 
database content. This research reminds us that web 
security is an important consideration in many phases of 
web development, including database design and 
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application development. Software written with the best 
of intentions may be vulnerable to creative attacks made 
by humans with very different thought processes than the 
software creators [48, 49]. The future of this research will 
emphasize the comparative efficiency of vulnerability 
detection [21, 50, 51, 52], keep expanding the 
functionality of the WSMS, and work with the Exploit 
Database [34] to use knowledge gained from our research 
to improve vulnerability detection performed on other 
websites. Then, as other researchers improve the state of 
knowledge about vulnerabilities and thus improve our 
work, a positive feedback loop will lead to enhanced 
vulnerability analysis that can be used for any website. 
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